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THE SOLLIS AGREEMENT CASES: 
THEIR EFFECT ON CONCEPTIONS AS TO 
THE RUNNING OF THE BURDEN IN 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS. 
It has recently been suggested 1 that a series of modern 
cases, primarily concerned with the enforceability of trade 
supply agreements, cast some element of doubt upon a seemingly 
unconnected area of the law which has largely been considered 
se ttled for the past sixty years. The suggestion made is that 
a recent string of cases on what are known as 'solus agreements' -
agreements, usually in respect of petrol, that supplies required 
by retailers shall be obtained exclusively from one supplier -
have provided pos sible evi de nce of a judicial change-of-heart 
as reg ards the purporte dly sett l e d p r inciple of land law t hat 
f or the burden of a res t ricti ve conv e nant to run, in Equity, 
to the co ve nantor's successor, with notice, there must subsist 
a dominant an d servient te nemen t re l ationsh ip. 
I t is t he object of this pap e r t o an a l y s e an d discuss 
fu r th e r t his intriguing possibility a nd to attempt to 
asce r ta i n how , if a t all, the so l us agr e em ent ca s es abrogat e 
or modify the rule necess i tating a dominant tenement for the 
running of the burde n of a restr i c tive covenant. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In order to appre c iate and evaluate thE suggested recent 
de velopm ents it is necess ary fi r st to examine i n some depth 
the history an d developmen t of th e restrict i ve coven ant, 
from its inception through to the present day, paying particular 
attention to tne ,arying fort~nes of the rule necessitating 
a domin a nt tenement . 
The restric ti ve covenan t is essentiall y a contrac t wh i ch 
seeks to regJ1ate the use of land. It would be clear ever 2t this 
stage in tne ctnalysis tha t such a creation, being the progery 
of two such imposing comp a rtme nt s of the law as con t r act and 1 and 
law, would provide considerable potent ial for jurisprude ntial 
c o r, f u s i o r, c s 1. I ~ c c, r : i- c c t L, a 1 c. ; c ~ , c u e t t) a s p e c t s o f i t s h e r- • r _ 2 
af f ected it character . In its infarcy t~e ,estricti\e co,enant 
was treated by the Cornwon La¼ as a mere contract which only 
~idEn!a lly ed and as its subject ratter. As such it was 
\t, 
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me ant that the restrictive cove nant was effective only 
be tw e en the contracting parties; no one who was not a party to 
the contract could enforce it or be bound by it. 
This rigid position maintained by the Common Law was 
softened somewhat by the subsequent allowing of the running of 
the bene fit of a restrictive covenant to the covenantee's 
suc cessors, provided certain conditions were met. By so 
allowing the benefit of the covenant to run, the Common Law 
was not making as generous a concession as may at first appear, 
as it wa s ne ce ssa r y to sh ow that the covenant was intended to 
2 n so run, and also that the coven~tor would not be placed under 
a ny ne w r estrictions not originally covenanted for. So the 
detrime nt to the cov e n;t or by all ow i ng the ben efit to run at 
law would rare l y outweigh the commonsense an d commerc i al 
advantage s o f all owing t he ben e f it of s uch cov ena nts to run. 
But although it was now pos sible for the benefit of the 
restrict ive co venant to r un in cert ain circu mstances, it be came 
clear at an ear ly stage that the burde n of a restrictive cov enant 
n 
woul d not be perm i tt ed t o run at la w t o f ett e r t he coven~tor's 
successor s i n t it l e . 3 The Com mon Law wo uld s anct ion a per so n 
gaining from a contract to which he was not a party, but it 
wo uld not coun t enance a third party suffering any detri ment 
due to such contrac t. 
The Courts of Equity a l tered the positi on substantially 
in 1848 i n th e land mark decision of Tulk v . Moxh al'._ ,
4 
in which it 
wa s conclusively he l d that the burden of a ne gative covenant 
af fecting land could thenceforth be enforceable aga inst 
n 
succ essors i n title of the co ven \tor, despite the lack of 
Fri vi t y of Contrac t o r Pr i vit} of Estat e . The c a se involv e d 
pro perty i n Leicester Square includi ng a fenced garden which was 
lai d out in the midd l e of the Square for the bene fit of the 
surro unding re si den ts . The owner sold a portio n of the Sq uare, 
in cl uding the garden ~hic h wa s sold subject to a restrict ive 
cov e nant that it should always remain a gard e n and s hould not be 
n 
buil t upon . Subse quently the coven~tee sought t o e nforce the 
c o v e n a n t c: r a i r s t a n c ~ s i 9 c. E C· f t h e o r i g i n a 1 c o v e r a~t o r v, h o r, a d 
t h re a t e n e d t o b u i l d u po n t h e s i t e o f t r, e g a r· d e n . L o r d C o t t e n h a r.1 
5 
exp oun de d the ba sis o f Equity' s enforceme nt of t he cove nant: 
tha t th e questio. doe s no t depen d upon 
,, 1, 2 ._ , e: ~ l r '= c :- , _ ~ r ~ ,- J ~ .:, v. i "'.. r : r e l a n d 
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is evident from this, that if there 
was a mere agreement and no covenant_, the 
Court would enforce it against a party 
purchasing with notice of it, for if an 
equity is attached to the property by 
the owner, no one purchasing with notice 
of that equity can stand in a different 
situation from the party from whom he 
purchased. 
The injunction sought was granted. The decisive factor in 
the view of the Court was knowledge by the defendant of the 
existance of the covenant, and a Court of Equity, being a 
court of conscience would not permit him to disregard a 
contractual obligation affecting the land of which he had notice 
at the time of his purchase. Reinforcing the notice basis for 
Equity's 
that the 
a crucial 
jurisdiction 
reality of a 
factor: 6 
in this case, Lord Cottenham also considered 
reduced price for the encu mbered land was 
Of course the price would be affected 
by the covenant and nothing could be more 
inequitable than that the original purchaser 
should be able to sell the property the next 
day for a greater price, in consideration of 
the assignee being allowed to escape 
from the liability which he had hi~self 
undertaken. 
The same sentiment is expressed in so mew hat different 
language in the Hall and Twells report: 7 
Of course th e party purchasing the 
property which is under such restriction 
gives less for it than he would have 
if he had bought it unincu~bered . 
Can there, then , be anything ore 
inequitable or contrary to good conscience, 
than that a party, who takes property at 
a less price beccu~E: it is subject to 
a restriction, shc~la rece ive the full 
value from a third ~arty, and that such 
third party should then hold it unfettered 
::.'_' :r,E: es: ric: i:r ur,er °"'hich it 1·,os 
grc::ntE:d? 
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A dominant and servient tenement relationship existed in 
Tulk v. Moxha , as the plaintiff retained a number of houses 
surrounding the garden, but the question must be asked whether 
the existence of this relationship was crucial to the decision 
or whether it was merely incidental. 8 Nowhere in the five known 
9 reports of the case can there be found an unequivocal statement 
that the decision was conditional upon the existance of such a 
relationship. The only real such hint as to this is to be 
found i n the P h i 1 1 i p s report :1 O 
/ 
it is now contended not that the 
vendee could violate that contract, 
but that he might sell the piece of 
land and that the purchaser from him 
may violate it without this court having 
any power to interfere. If that were so 
it would be impossible for an owner of 
land to sell part of it without incurring 
the risk of rendering what he retains 
worthless. 
This statement does not appear in the same terms in any of 
the other reports, although the Hall and Twells report refers 
twice to 'neighbour', as at page 111 of that report where there 
is the statement: "where the owner of a piece of land enters into 
a cc.ntract with ~is ne_i_ghbou_i::_" (emphasis added). These phrases, 
which have subsequently been relied upon to justify the modern 
necessity for a retained do~irant tenement, can hardly be 
considered defini tive. It is quite tenable to interpret these 
statement s as bein g made in reference to the case where tre 
covenantee does in fact retain some proximate land, rather than 
seeing them as demanding that he do so. It could be con tended , 
with little fear of conclusi ve rebuttal , that Lord Cottenham took 
for granted the existence of a dominant tenemen t in this case, 
but it see~s rctther surprisirg 1tat His Lordsh ip should neg~ect 
to at least comment upon such a potentially important aspect 
of the doctrine, especially considering the fact that he was 
u,,doubtedly breaking nev. grcuric in this decision, and there was 
:r,E.refore little in tne v.ay o.c estab lished doctrire ll v.hicr-1 could 
be re lied upon to fill in the unspoken necessity for a dominant 
ter,emen t. 
-;-tie broad equitable prir.c~p·e :::.::" inc Tul~ v. :·~:>-ha) was 
C i r L S 5 E d i n t h e C h a :" t e r p a r· t .J C a ~ e C .. r E' d ~ ~ C 5 \ . C: ~ t S O n i n 
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which Knight Bruce L.J. stated: 
12 
Reason and justice seem to prescribe 
that, at least as a general rule, where 
a man by gift or purchase acquires 
property from another, with knowledge 
of a previous contract made by him 
with a third person to use and employ 
the property for a particular purpose 
in a specified manner, the acquirer 
shall not, to the material damage of 
the third person, in opposition to the 
contract and inconsistantly with it, 
use and employ the property in a manner 
not allowable to the giver or seller. 
This rule, applicable alike, in gene ral 
as I conceive, to moveable and i mm oveable 
property. 
So on the basis principally of the equitable doctrine of 
notice and through the decision in Tulk v. Moxhay, despite an 
adament rejection of the suggestion~ly o-;;, 
1
3it was now clear 
that a restrictive covenant meeting the appropriate requirements 
was an interest in propert y, as it was enforceable against persons 
with whom there was neither Privity of Contract nor Privity of 
Estate. 14 
The restrictive covenant ~as corverted frow a personal 
i,,tere st, solely derived from contract, into a property interest 
by th e Courts of Equity on the basis of an equitabl e doctrine -
therefore a restrictive covenant is an equitable interest in land. 
But Equity was not to have t~ings all its own way ; the Common Law 
considered the categories of incorporeal hereditament closed and 
theref ore this new creation coul d only be accomodated if it cou ld 
e seen as an extension in Equity of so~e existing category of 
land interest . 15 This is evid~nced by the oft-quotrd statement of 
1 6 Jessel M.R. in Go mm v. London & S.v; . Rl_y which was to govern 
the play from then on: 
t r e d o c t r i n e o f T u 1 f · v . 1,·, c > r, 2 v ~ s 
either an extension in Eouity of the 
doctrine of ~encer's cas~ or else 
CVl extension in equity of the doctrine 
o -:"" 1 e S"' a t i v e e a s e r" e n + s . 
The consequence of this obiter cictuw has effectively been 
tG ceny the restrictive covenant recognition in its own right; at 
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every turn the restrictive covenant has been haunted by this 
uncharacteristically improvident aside. 
Supplementing Jessel M.R. 's two candidates for the uncomfortable 
adoptive parentage of the restrictive covenant is the statement 
of Farwell J. in Re Nisbett and Potts' Contract: 17 
this equity although created by 
covenant or contract as such, but 
stands on the same footing with, and is 
completely analogous to an equitable charge 
on real estate created by some 
predecessor in title of the present owner 
of the land charged. 
This state ment, had it been followed by the courts, could 
ha ve led to a different conclusion in relation to the need for 
a dominant tene ment because it is quite possible to have equitable 
charges existing in gross. But the suggestions of equitable 
c h a r g e a n d e q u i t a b 1 e e x t e n s i o n o f S_p ~ n c e r ' s c a ~ 1 8 we re n e v e r 
overtly latched onto by the courts, r ather it was the a nalogy to 
the negative ease ment which was favoured by the courts in 
19 e xplaining the jurisprudential nature of the restrictive covenant. 
Str ic t adhe r ence to this anal ogy work ed to de characterise the 
res trictive co ven ant a nd ma ke it l oo k li ke n•ere ly a special kind 
of negative e a sement, but what has often been o ve rlooked is that 
we are only dealing with an analogy, the c omp ari s on with the 
negat i ve ease!T'e nt is not, and wa s ne ver meant to be , de fi nitive. 
A s M c r~ o r 1 a n d s a y s o f t h e r e s t r i c t i v e co v e r, a n t : " B u t a s a c o n c e p t 
it is sui gen e r is and should be t reated as such ". 20 In re cent ti mes 
t his analogy has faltered due to the rest rai nt of trade as pect 
of th e s ol us agree!T'e nt. v.'hereas an ease1°en t ca n either be c rea ted 
a s a con di t ion under whic h a ne~ proprieto r take s the l a nd or a s 
a g r ant from an incu mb e nt pr o pr i et or, it is apparent from recent 
21 sol us agree ment cases that the powe r of an incu mbent to grant 
res~r ict i ve covenants , of the sclus agrcer,,ent type , fTlay be 
fetter ed by t he doct rin e of restraint of trade . Someone com i ng 
to land for the first time l os e s noth i ng by takin g la nd s ubject 
an incumbent 
to a re st r aint, but it a ppears t~at Aproprietor cannot co ven ant 
a,,a certain f re e doms wi thout of-f_r,ding asairst :re doctr i ne of 
restra i nt o f t r ade. 
Th e purporte d re qui reme nt fo r a retained domi na nt tenemen t 
• ru ~ appear to have be en i mported io the restr i c ti ve covenan t 
~ l JrS~arce of this analogy tc ~ative ~~senents , and this 
c.cir.:E:nt:on is ~crn e o ut by the fact that v,h ile th e restricti,e 
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covenant was still under the full control of Equity there were 
two leading cases decided which denied the necessity for a 
dominant tenement to be retained, or even to have ever existed, 
n 
i n o r de r f o r the coven a,.t o r ' s s u cc e s so r s i n t i t l e to be bound . 
The first of these cases, Catt v. Tourle;
2
involved the 
plaintiff, a brewer, selling land to a freehold land society 
who covenanted with him that he would have the exclusive right 
of supplying beer to any public house erected on the site. 
The defendant, a member of the society, acquired a portion of the 
l and, with notice of the covenant, and built a public house upon 
it and supplied it with his own beer. The Court of Appeal 
confirmed the plaintiff's rightto enforce the covenant against 
the defendant without apparently even considering the possibility 
that the plaintiff might be bar r ed from doing so because he retained 
no land in the vicinity of the r estricted land. Somewhat 
prophetically the defendant challenged the covenant as being an 
un r ea sonable restraint of t r ade, but the court held that such a 
cove nant, although unlimited in ti me, was sufficiently limited in 
spa ce, and good according to the nature of the trade and the 
pre vailing conceptions as to restraint of trade. 
23 
T h e s e c o n d c a s e , t h a t o f _L u k e ~ v . _Q_e_!l n i s , 2 4 r e p r e s e n t s t h e 
greate st e xtre me to which the restrictive covenant ba s ed purely 
on the equitable concept of notice was carried. The case involved 
the l eas e of a public house by a b r ew er to a publican, with a 
cc.enant by th e latt er to purc hase a ll bee r, win e and sp i r i t s f rom 
the brew er not only for the public nous e i nclu ded in the l ease 
but also for an other public house held by the publican under 
anothe r l an dl o rd. Fry J. af ter con s ide ring Knight Bruce L.J. 's 
s t a t e f11 e n t i n O_ e J,\ a t t o ~ v . G i b s o r, , a n d t h e d e c i s i o n i n C_a t t v . T o u r l ~ , 
hel d t hat a cov e nant wa s bindi ng in Eq uity upon an ass i gnee of t he 
seco nd public house who had notice of the covenant, saying at 
r, age 2 3 6 : 
I t hin k therefore I arr bouna to 
give effect to the eq uitabl e do ct ri ne 
of notice. 
These two deci s ion s have been round y crit icised - Che s hir e 
+ . L I D . 2S re · E: ,- r 1 r I g to u t e r v . -~ n n 1 s as 
a n indefen sible extensio n of a 
contractu al lia bili ty to a non -
cor tracting party . 
f:..rd :E:garry and Wad e: 26 
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It is axiomatic that the justification 
for converting a personal covenant into 
an equitable encumbrance is to enable 
the covenantee to preserve the value 
of other land of his in the neighbourhood. 
The implications arising from these two tied-house cases 
require further consideration in order to evaluate the validity 
of these criticisms. The effect of the cases is claimed to be 
to make the covenant personal to the covenantee rather than 
related to his land or tenure. The question must be asked: 
what interest is the non-landholding covenantee seeking to protect 
by attempting to enforce the coven ant against the covenantor's 
successor? It is not a whimsical personal vendetta or an 
officious intrusion that he is seeking to further, yet neither 
is it actual land that he is aiming to protect for he now no 
longer has, or never did have, any land in the vicinity which 
ma y be adversely affected by the breach. The true object of his 
concer n is so me business interest. The concept of the 
prote ction of a business interest by use of a restrict ive covenant 
may be significantly buttressed by t he decision in Newton Abbot 
C o o ~ v . ~ i l l i a m s o n _ & T c e a d g_ o l j_ 2 7 w h e r e , d e s p i t e t h e p r e v i o u s 
descr iption of such interests as mer ely collateral, the enforce-
abi 1 i ty of a covenant placing a rest riction on the form of 
busine ss permitted to be undertaken on the coven¾tor's land was 
accepte d in relation to an assignee of the cover~tor. Upjohn J. 
saying that a co\ enant prohibiting sorts of inoffersive bu sin es s 
was enforceable against the coven~tor's assigns notwithstanding 
that it was clearly taken for the preventi on of_co~petitio~ . 
Th'.:'. dec ision was founded upon the equitable doc trine of notice 
and th e fact of enhanced resale va1ue for unencumbered land -
the very reasons held decisive by Lord Cottenham in Tulk v. Moxhax'. 
Bu t the possibility of a business interest being a 
d~rrin ant tenement is denied b) F cstor end r e\,so m: 
28 
A business cannot be tbe corriran t 
tenement , the decision upholding 
a brewer's tie as against an assign 
of tte coven antor having been 
expressly disap proved in L.C.C . v. Allen. 
L.C.C. v. ALLEN: Ar Ur~l"r Pcda:ile lcut'crit_vt 
Tne dE-cision of t1;e C:rgl:sr, Cct..r: ..... 7 ::__ ,~c- cl in L·rdo r~ 
Cc,r-:-.\ r\.,c,unci 1, v. J,ller 29 P'·, d u - _ u r ,. 8 1 : e _\ 1 -= :::, , 2 s c n ) d o L L t r e 1 o : i n g 
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to the necessity for a dominant and servient tenement relationship 
in order to bind in Equity the covenantor's successors. In that 
case the owner of a plot of land covenanted with the Council that 
he would not erect any buildings on the plot without the Council's 
consent. It was admitted that the Council did not possess, nor 
were they interested in any neighbouring land for the benefit 
of which the covenant was imposed. The owner subsequently sold 
the _ plot to the defendant who had notice of the restrictive 
covenant. The defendant then proceeded to build houses on the 
section without having obtained the requisite consent. The 
Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the plaintiff's action, 
holding that the plaintiff could not rely on the covenant as 
against a successor in title of the covenantor because the 
covenant , not being for the benefit of any dominant tenement, 
could only be seen as personal. Buckley L.J. was emphatic as 
to the absolute fatality of the non-existance of a dominant 
tenement to the running of the burden, and condemned Catt v. 
Tourle an d Luker v. Dennis as no longer being good law on 
this poin t. 
It is somewhat surprising that while L.C.C. v. Allen is 
universally and religiou sly cited for the principle necessitating 
a dominant ten e~ ent it is far from being a har ~onious decision 
within itself. Desp ite the vigour and conviction of Lord Justice 
Buckley's judgment the other two judges are much more reserved, 
a1 Go st do ubtful, and both resignedly find themselves bound 
b · d · · 3o f. d 1- d Af f. d. y previous ec1s1ons to 1n as t, ·e_y o . ter 1n 1ng 
hi mself bound Kenne "y L.J. was rnoved to say: 31 
whateve r might be my o~n opinion 
if I ~as not controlled by such 
re cent de cisions, but free ... to 
treat a restrictive covenant .. . 
as enforceable in equity at the suit 
of the covenantee, although be may 
retain no other land which can be 
affected by the covenant, 
agairst an assign of the covenanter who 
has ac quired the land ~it~ no ti ce of the 
restriction . 
S l . d ,. . 32 crutton J. is even ess con 1nce , noL1ng: 
Though the co\ e nant e e ir t hat c ase 
[Tu 1 h ,, . r: c > .... at] c i c ho ~ : a ~: a c e r, t 1 and , 
there is no trace in t · e j udsn ent of 
- 10 -
Lord Cottenham of the require ment that 
the covenantee should have and continue 
to hold land for the benefit of the 
covenant. I read Lord Cottenham 1 s 
judgment as proceeding entirely on 
the question of notice of the cove nant. 
Af t er conducting a thorough survey of the ca s es states: 33 
Up to 1881 ... I cannot trace, nor 
could counsel before us discover, that 
.I_ul!_ v. Mox hay had bee n based on 
anything but notice of the covenant 
by the assign e e. 
And fu r ther: 34 
Th e f ir st dep a rt ur e from th is position 
occ urs in the j udgmen t o f Jessel M. R. 
in Go mm v. Lo ndon & S . W. Rly. 
And at page 668 quotes and comments upon a pas s a ge f r om Ri gby 
J. 1 s judgme nt in Roger~ v . Hoseg_~oj_ 35 
11 ! do not th ink any covenant r uns 
with th e l an d in e qu ity. The 
equitable doctrine is that a person 
who takes with notic e of a covenant is 
bound by i t 1' ; a re mark a gai n wh ic h 
seems to me t o ha rron i s e with the 
earlier authorities . 
Scrutton J . goes on to emplo y the ultimate state11ent of judicial 
d . t · f t· 36 1ssa 1s a c ion : 
It may be if the matter is considered by 
a higrer tribur al, that tribLnal riay 
see its way to revert to what I think 
wa s t he e a rlier doctrine of notice . 
The learned judge reluctantly firds hi~se 1 f bound by the earlier 
37 cases and concludes : 
I regard it as very regrettable that 
a publ i c body sh ou l d be pr e ven t e d f r om 
enforcir~ a restriction on tne use of 
property, impose d for the public 
benefit, against persons who bought 
the property krowing of the restriction , 
by t r e a ~· p a r e n t l y i , ,, c • e r i a l l i c u ,,, s t a n c e 
that the public body doEs ro: o~r any land 
-11-
in the immediate neighbourhood. 
So the position of L.C.C. v. Allen may not be as strongly 
founded and unshakeable as is generally considered and it may be 
the case that the unquestioning faith in the conclusiveness 
of the decision, or more correctly, of Buckley L.J. 's leading 
judgment, is the very reason that the case has never since been 
challenged head-on. 
Murmurs of doubt and discontent, adding to those of 
Kennedy L.J. and Scrutton J. within L.C.C. v. Allen itself, can 
be detected from time to time. Most noticeable recently are the 
occasional comments of Lord Wilberforce, as in Sefton V. 
we do not know, for the par ties have not 
told us , whether the cov en antee owned 
any land for the benefit of which these 
covenants subsist. And under what I am 
content for present purposes to take 
as accepted doctrine (see L.C.C. v. Allen), 
in the absence of any such land the 
burden of the covenants would not run with 
land. 
38 Tophams: 
the covenanter's 
And in Nationa l Prov;dence Bank v. H~_ti!]gS Ca[_fi.art 39 where His 
Lord ship commented : 
Fifty years ago it was decided that 
an obligation ... relating to the use 
of 1 and , of a perso ral nature , was 
not binding on a purchaser, and Buckley 
L.J. in his judg me nt in the Court of 
Appea l refuted precisely the argument 
which was advance d nere .... There may, 
I recognise, be something to be said for 
the view that the Courts have, in this 
field, ta~en too strict a l ine 
~, en corrments such as these frorr a judge of Lord Wilberforce's 
pre-eminen ce are consi derec alongside the doubts expressed by 
Kenne dy L.J. and Scrutton J., and the approved decision of 
U J:, j o h n J . ( a s h e t h e n v. a s ) i n t h e t, e "' t o r A b b o t t C o o J2. . c a s e , 
tne pede stal upon which L.C.C~ v. Allen has been set must be 
seen 
trat 
to be wavering. 
A further interesting and Lrsettling case in this respect is 
40 c, f t e I o r· d S t r a t h c c n a S t E: c r. s n i E_ v . u o rr, i n i o n _ C o ~-l , a 
c'Pcision of the Priv y Council Ori qt-e al from Nova Scotia concerr·ir,g 
-12-
a charterparty. Their Lordships, through Lord Shaw, discussed 
41 
the ge neral equitable principal e xpounded by Knight Bruce L.J. 
in ~~ttos v. Gibson, and applied to land in Tulk v. Moxhay, 
but then Their Lordships qualified the Tulk v. Moxhay rule by 
appr oving the L.C.C. v. Allen principle. 
42 
But despite this 
expres s a ppr oval of L.C.C. v. Alle~ it ha s bee n st r ongly 
conte nded th a t Their Lo r dships' deference was insincere. In 
Ch e~ hi re and Fi foot's Law of Contract 43 the lea r ned author says 
o f t he St r athcona case: 
The Pr ivy Co uncil recognise d t he 
necessity for its [i.e. prop rietary 
interest retained by the co ve nante~ 
ex i st en ce , but t hey can scar cely be 
sa id t o hav e foun d i t in the facts 
be f or e them ... The Pri vy Co un cil in 
fact paid lip ser vi ce to the mo dern 
doctrine of Tu l k v . Mox h~,l but a pp l i e d 
i t a s i t e x i s t e d i n a n e a r 1 i e r e n v ( o n -
ment . 
This detected dissatisfaction with the hard lega l aspects 
irr•ported to the Tulk v. Moxhay pri nc iple by L.C.C. v. Allen 
may be evidence o f a move to retu1 , to the purer equitable 
princip l e based on notic e. The courts appear to be taking 
cognizance of the shortcomings of the L.C.C~ v. Alle~ unsparing 
requireffient of a retained physical dominant tenement, especially 
in that it provides no answer to the injustice foreseen by Lord 
Cottenham whereby the covenanter, presu~abl y paying a lower price 
for the land subject to the restriction, can, where the covenan ee 
f a l l s f o u l o f t h e _L . C . C ~ v . A 1 l e ~ s t r i n g e n c y , i m rr e d i a t e l y c o n v e y 
the affected land to a knowingful purchaser and receive a much 
enhanced price for the now unencumbered land - a land speculator's 
dream ! 
_8~i!:_ional __6_s_pects of the Dominant Tenement Rule 
Before moving on to examine the suggeste d possibility that 
the group of solus agroenent c2ses nay contribute to the perceptior 
of judicial unease as regards tne score of the L.C.C. v. Atlen 
principle it is necessary in order to complete the picture, to 
f i r s t l y , d e t a i l a c o u p l e o f s u p p l e rn e n t a r y a s p e c t s o f t h e 
do rr i r or: t t er e ,rent r u l e w hi c h nu s t L Ee b c ,· r, e i n 1, i I d \.\hen l o o k i n g 
at the sol us agreerrent cases; and secor aly, to point out the s~ecial 
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situation in which New Zealand finds itself in relation to 
this whole topic. 
It is now clear that for a dominant/servient tenement 
relationship to exist what is needed is some degree of physical 
proximity 44 although the dominant tenement need not actually be 
contiguous to the servient land. This can be seen primarily 
through the analo~y with easements, as in Todrick v. Western National 
Omnibus Coy. 45 where it was held that a right of way can validly 
be ma de appurtenant to land with which the way has no physical 
contiguity. That the proximity, rather than contiguity, standard 
applied also to restrictive covenants can be seen from the 
Newt on Abbott case where the relevant plots of land were on 
oppos ite sides of the street. 
It is also clear that apart from having a dominant/servient 
tenement relationship in space, that is, by physical proximity of 
two pieces of land, it is also possible to have a dominant/ 
servient tenement relationship in time. A landlord's 
reversionary interest is sufficient to cons titute a 'dominant 
tenemen t' and enable him to sue a sub-lesseein Equity on a 
restr ictive covenant contained in the lease. There is no need 
for any other l and vJ h i c h co u l d be seen as a do mi nan t tenement .4 6 
Preston and Nev.1 som state:47 
In cases between landlord and tenant 
this difficulty does not arise since 
performance is on the devised land and 
that land is obviously touched and 
concerned by what is done there. 
And in Teap~ v. _Dous~ Swi nfen Eady J. states: 48 
It is clear if a person acquires an 
underlease, though not being bound 
in law by the restrictive covenants 
of the lease, if he purchased with notice 
of the covenants he will not be allowed to 
use the land in contravention of the 
covenants. 
A similar modification of the r~~e applies to mortgages so that 
a n,ortg agee's interest in the rrortga9ed land likev.ise suffices 
as a dominant tenement. This can be seen from another tied-
49 house case, John Bros. Abergarw BrPwery v. Holme~ v.here covenants, 
t r s t r i c t i v e o f t r e r u r c h a s e o f L E: E: r , c o r. t a i n e d i n t h e s e co n d 
c, ~~age of a leasehold public house ¼ere held to bind in Equity 
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anyone deriving title under the original mortgagor, including an 
unde rless ee, with notice, until the rede mption of the mortgage. 
A recent case involving a solus agreement approves these 
old decisions on landlords' and mortgagees' interests. In 
~ ent Oil v. Gregory Harman L.J. said: 5o 
As bet wee n landlord a nd t enant the 
cov e nant will run while t he l e ase 
persists. Now a mo r tgag e e has of 
necessity an interest in the land, 
the subj e ct ma t t er of the c harg e, 
which I think he is e ntitl e d to 
pro t ect by covenants relating to the 
user of it. 
New Zealand may be in something o f a priv i leged posit i on 
shou ld t he _h__: C_0__:_ v. All en pr inc ip l e be moving out of favo ur o r 
its s co pe bein g mo dified. Unlike the United Ki ngd om a nd Australia 51 
the req uiremen t in Ne w Ze al a nd for a dom i na nt t enemen t is not so 
c l e a r , i n l i g h t o f t h e Co u r t o f A p p e a 1 d e c i s i o n i n S t ~ l e2 v . 52 _Co_C_b.l'_ . There th e cov e n an te e sold the freeho l d of a pub lic 
hous e t o t he covenan tor who covenante d t o t a ke only t he covenan -
tee's beer. The defendant bought the public house with notice of 
the covenant and entered into possession and supplied it with 
other beer . Upon the covenantee seeking to enforc e th e covenant 
the Court of Appeal reluctantly followed the then cur r e nt 
Cat!_ v. Tourl~ line of authority based on notice, and allowed 
enforcement of the covenant . But the reluctance expressed by the 
court was more as to the undesirability on these +acts of all owing 
any pos si ble assignee of the covenantee to enforce such a 
covena nt, rather than to allowing the covenantee himself enforcing 
it against the covenantor's assigns . 
There has been no subsequent New Zealand case which ha s 
purported to overrule Staples v. Corby. 
P r o f e s s o r C a I p b e 1 l i n -h i- s : 9 ~ l a ; L i c l e 5 3 p o i n t s o u t t h a t 
"the equitable interest of the covenantee has come to be regarded 
as i n t he nature of an equitable easement" a nd th at the analogy 
has been taken too far in saying that as in an easement a 
restr ictive covenant also requi ~s a dominant terement . He poirts 
to section 122 of the Property Law ~et 1952 which peemits ease-
rrents in ~ross, and contends that by this the analogy, in requiring 
a do ir i r, a ri t t e r. e r e n t i n re s t r i c t i v e cc v e n a n t s , c a n n o 1 o r g e r be 
S U S t c i r1 E d . 
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He suggests that 54 
The fact that in New Zealand the 
Legislature has permitted the creation 
of legal easements in gross further 
supports the view that the restrictions 
should be unaffected by the requirement 
for a dominant estate. 
But if we are looking for indications from the Legislature we must 
also note that, as Brookfield explains 55 , whereas section 126 
of the Property Law Act 1952 allows notation on the register of 
restrictive covenants benefitting other land, it provides no 
direct means of noting restrictive covenants existing in gross 
should they be accepted. 
The Salus Agreement Cases 
The scene has now been set sufficiently to allow a discussion 
of the suggestion 56 that the sol us agreement cases may be 
evincing a return to a purer equitable form of restrictive 
covenant , enforceable on Lord Cottenham's criteria of notice and 
better price, and founded on the broad Equitable doctrine of 
unconscionability, rather than being dependant upon hard legal 
criteria imposed through rigid pursuance of an analogy with 
negative easement s. 
Salus agreements are essentially supply contracts made 
between a bulk supplier and a retailer whereby the retailer agrees 
to take his supplies exclusively frorr the one supplier for a 
certain period, provided that the supplier can maintain supplies. 
In return the supplier gives the retailer a standing discount on 
his purchases and often provides various fringe-benefits in the 
~ay of advertising, promotion and equipment. The old tied-house 
covenants were basically solus agree ments , but recently it has 
been in the area of petrol and oil supplies that solus agreements 
r, 2. v e m o v e d 1 n t o t h e l i me l i g h t . 
It appears that solus agreements in respect of petrol became 
widespread in the United Kingdom in the early 1960's and that 
initially they ~orked well for both parties - the retailer getting 
a guaranteed supply of petrol at ~ reouced price ,a long with 
associated benefits through being part of a nationwide network 
of branded outlets ,a nd quite often be,ng supplied with pumps and 
eq~ip~ent bearing the supplier's rcne and symbols; and the 
supplier gainirg guaranteed sales giving a degree of certaintj o'f' 
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of demand and the ability to benefit from distribution planning 
and organised advertising. But in the middle of that decade 
the petroleum industry experienced a price war of ·unprecedented 
magnitude and ferocity. Retailers were being tempted away from 
the companies to which they were tied by rival oil companies 
bearing offers of discounts and benefits far exceeding those 
available under the existing solus agreement. Retailers began 
challenging and breaking their pre-price war solus agreements 
on the alleged grounds that they constituted unreasonable restraints 
of trade - thus leading to the spate of cases upon solus 
agreements in the latter half of the decade. 
It is beyond the objects of this paper to deal in any 
dept h with the restraint of trade aspects of the solus agreement 
beyond noting that it was the doctrine of restraint of 
trade which rendered the solus agreement litigious and caused it 
to become juridically known. Neither is it within the scope of this 
paper to examine the various complicated arrangements \~hich were 
concocted for reasons of tax avoidance 
57 and in an attempt to keep 
one step ahead of the developing restraint of trade doctrine, 
whereby there came an increasing sophistication in the form of 
solus agreements. This resulted in a movement away from simple 
'naked' agreements between a supplier and an established retailer 
to complicated sale and lease-back or mortgage arrangements. 
Although it must be noted in relation to this that the steadily 
changing form ~ould often incidentally remedy possible inadequacies 
as to the running of restrict ive covenant burdens, should tnese 
prove to be relevant, as the covenantee began to gain various 
interests in the burdened land. 
It is appropriate to point out at this stage that the dearth 
of New Zealand cases on petrol solus agreements cou1d be due to 
the fact that such agreements would appear contrary to the Motor 
Spirits Distribution Act 1953, unless approved by the Licensing 
Authority. And that similarly, the question of tied-houses in 
relation to the supply of beer will not arise in New Zealand as 
secti on 296 of the Sale of Liquor Act 1962 renders such tying 
covenants void . 
Solus Agreements - Evidencing the Demise of the 
Do~inant Tenement? 
~hat this r per is primarily concerned ~ith is the suggestion 
: r, at these so 1 u: a g 1-e e, en t c a s e s a re co ·er t 1 y say i n g so rn et hi n g c bout 
the nature of the r ules relating to restrictive covenants. 
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Solus agreements are being consistantly referred to by 
judges as 'restrictive covenants', examples abound; 
- Lord Denning M.R. in Cleveland v. Dartstone: 
5
B· 
when a person takes possession of 
premises under a lease, not having 
and later: 
been in possession previously, and 
in taking possession, enters into a 
restrictive covenant trying him to 
take all his supplies from the lessor 
59 
They knew that there was this 
restrictive covenant upon the land 
and nevertheless entered into this 
assignment binding themselves to it. 
- Salmon L.J. in the same case: 
60 
its right to trade on the premises 
derives only from the lease which 
contains the restrictive covenant 
61 
- Lo r ds Re i d a n d P e a r c e i n E s s o P e t r o 1 e um v . H a r p e r s Ga r a g e 
- and His Honour Sir Alfred North, President of the Court of 
A p p e a l , i n R o b _i n s o ~ v . G o l d e n C h i p 2 :6 2 
Clause 4 is undoubtedly a restrictive 
covenant in that it requires the 
appellants not to purchase any of the 
stipulated goods from any other source. 
The question mu st be asked as to what these eminent judges 
are saying . Are they using the specialised term 'restrictive 
covenant' in a loose sense to mean merely a covenant which is 
restrictive in its terms, or are they using it in its legal 
sens e to mean the equitable creation founded on the case of Tulk 
v. Moxhay . It is unlikely that the former is the case as the term 
is being used by a number of judges, and by judges who would not 
use a recognised specialised ·erw. in such ~aphazard a manner. It 
must be that these solus agreements are being classified as 
'restrictive covenants' in the legal sense of the term. This 
contention is borne out by the e:xpress application to solus 
cJgreei:·ents of the 1 aw applicable to 'restrictive covenants' in 
cases such as Reaent Oil v. Greaory 63 and Petrofina v. Martin 
64 
'Ill. -- _.., - - --- - -
which both discuss aspects of Tul~ v. Moxhay and L.C~C~ v. Alle~ 
relation to solus agreeme ts. And the statement by Jacobs J. 
65 
i n Q u e1 d r ct n a i Q_ v . _? e v a s t~p c l t h a t 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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the law on restraint of trade 
and the law on restrictive 
covenants have been greatly and 
concurrently developed over the 
last hundred years or so. 
also serves to tie together the two doctrines and to suggest that 
therestraint of trade solus agr eeme nt is also a property law 
restrictive covenant. 
A third possibility explaining the use of the term 
'restrictive covenant' in the solus agreement cases must be noted. 
The term 'restrictive covenant' is in accepted legal usage to 
d . b 66 escri e 
clauses in contracts of partnership 
and emp loy ment which limit a contracting 
party after termination of the contract 
in performing similar work for a period 
of ti me and within a certain geographical 
area. 
And as such was used by Younger L.J. in Dewes v. Fitch. 
67 
Although there are obvious attractions in saying that all that is 
oeing done in the solus agreement cases is to adopt a term recog-
nised in one area of restraint of trade into usage in another 
area of restraint of trade, t his does not square with the 
treatment of 'restrictive covenant' in th e cases discussed. The 
fact that the solus agreement is being considered in the area of 
pr0perty law would suggest that 'restrictive covenant' is beiGg 
used in the recognised property law sense of the term . The 
hazards attendant upon using a specialised term to mean one thing, 
in an area of law where it ~e ans another, would be obvious and 
conclus ive against such an cccurrence. 
So it appears that the courts may see solus agreements as 
being actual property law restrictive covenants, but if so, 
v.nere are all the hall ~er! s of the classical restrictive coveriarot? 
Primari ly restrictive covenants, in order to attract that mantle, 
required a dominant/servient tenement relationship to subsist 
and also needed as a subject a covenant which was not merely 
. ersonal to the parties the~selves but one which could be said to 
'touch and concern' the land . 
There are a number of reasons for doubting that the solus 
cgr t e ~ent cases are purportirg to do a~ay with ~he L.C.C . v. Allen 
n e c e s s i t y f' or a don i n a t te n e 'rent . I n a nu r, t, er of the cases : he 
L.C.C . v. Allen principle, despite its cenons:rably insecure t2.se, 
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has be en expressly approved. 
v. Martin: 
68 
Lord Denning stated in 
if once the new company acquired the 
legal title to the garage Petrofina 
would have no claim against the new 
company because Petrofina own no land 
in the vicinity. 
And Lord Justice Harman in Regent Oil v. Gregory: 
69 
Ungoed- Thomas J. found great difficulty 
her e beca use the cov en a nt e e had no 
other land to protect and a cov en ant 
dependant on Tulk v. Moxhay would 
be good only while that state of 
thing s continue d: se e L~f.:.__ v. 
Allen ci t ed by t he j udg e. I do no t 
think that this reasoning has any 
a pplication to a c as e betwe en l es so r 
an d l es s ee. line 
Petrofina 
Th us Harman L.J. is accepting the L.C.C. v . Alle nAbut is emp loy ing 
a \al id e xcepti on to it. And i n ~~Oil v. Lea vesley St amp J. 
comme nted : ?O 
It is convenient to mention that in 
this case the plainti f f ha d no interest 
as owner, mortgagee , o r l es so r of the 
l a nd on which the garage and petrol 
s t ation stands. 
So it ca n be seen from these exampl e s that any judicial discus s ion 
of solus agre em ent s in relation t o the need for a dominant 
teneme nt is be i ng b rack et e d wi t h an a f fi rma t i on of t he basic L.C.C. 
v . _A~ princ i ple 
Con t r i buting t o th e doubts whi c h must be enterta i ne d i n 
r elatio n to the sugge stion th at the solus ag r ee ment c ases are 
point ing to an eros ion of t he necess i ty to have s om e kind of 
domin ant t enem ent is the conti nuing de vel op~e nt of the analogy 
betwe en restrictive covenants and e ase ~ents. Th is an a log y, 
which , as di scusse d earlier, appar e nt ly le d to the necessity for 
2. don.inan t tenc11 e nt f o r t he ru nning of restri ctive cove nants has 
r e c e n t 1 y b e e n s t r e n g t h e n e d by t h e c a s e o f Be __l_j__} t ~~ 7 1 w h e r e by 
restric tive cov e nants have be en brou ght into line with the 
si uation 11erta iring to easen,erits as regar a s extingu ish,,en t 
througn unit y o f se isin. It wculd be incon sista nt to see the 
analog y with eas e me nts being s :rengthen ed in rela tion t o t hi s 
aspect yet being weakened as regards the need for a dominant 
ten em ent. 
Another factor dissuading from such a view i~ the lack of a 
single solus agreement case in which the judge admits the possibility 
of, or the decision on the facts renders implicit, the binding of 
a successor in title of the covenantor to a covenantee who has 
no dominant tenement. In actual fact the opposite may have 
occurred - where the relevant facts have arisen and the court 
has not even adverted to the possibility of binding the 
covrnantor's successor. 72 In Esso Petrol ~~ v. ~i!:1._gswood Motors 
the defendant, a retail petrol company, entered into a solus 
agreement with the plaintiff oil company which included the 
usual 'continuity clause' requiring the defendant company to 
notify Esso of any proposal to transfer the garage and to procure 
the purchas er to enter a si milar solus agreement with Esso. 
A mor tgage was associated with the solus agreement, with Esso as 
mortgage es. A company na me d I mpac t Holdings procured Kingswood's 
shares and th roug h Kingswood repaid the mortgage and then, 
unknown to Esso, got the garage transferred to I mpac t Holdings' 
subs idiary Impact Motors. The latter compan y shared the same 
two directors as its parent company. Impact Motors the n broke 
the solus agreement. Here v,as an open invitation to the court 
to enforce a solus agreement against an assignee of the covenantor 
to whom , by the merest piercing of the corporate veil, could be 
ascribed knowledge of the covenant in an atmosphere scented with 
fraud and where the plaintiff no longer held an interest in that 
land or any other lan d. But the court did not advert to this 
possibi lity, rather Bri dge J. held that since I mpac t had 
procured Kingswood's breach of its obligations the court could 
order undone what was done and order the reconveyance of the land 
to Kingswood . No me ntion was made of the suggested possible 
alternati ve of enforcing the solus agreement against the new 
Proprietor:; . But this decision carir,ot be seen as conclusive 
against the suggested solus agree~ent contention as it is apparent 
from the latter part of Bridge J . 's judgment 73 that counsel for 
the defendants argued that by the court allowing such injunctions 
a~ainst them then 
that doctrine ~onsp iracy to induce 
breach of contract] wi 11 come into 
head-on collision with the other 
doctrine [ Tul~ v. Mox.hay as modified 
by L.C.C.:.. v. Allen] restricting the 
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court's power, once the land has 
changed hands, to enforce against 
the new owner any obligation 
deriving from contractual covenants 
entered into by the former owner. 
Bridge J. 's reply to this rather· forlorn contention that the court's 
powers to so act against such tortfeasors were fettered by the 
conspir~tors' succeeding in obtaining a transfer of the land 
makes it clear that the two are separate doctrines and thus it 
can be seen that His Honour's dealing of the case on the grounds 
of conspiracy to induce breach of contract may not exclude 
the suggested solus agreement-based alternative. 
Other aspects of the solus agreement cases which are being 
employe d to support the suggestion that the need for a dominant 
tenement may be on the way out are inconclusive. It is true 
that there has been a revival in the citing of Catt v. Tourle, 
despite the condemnation of it in L.C.C. v. Allen as no longer 
being good law, but it is being cited not for its implications 
as to the need for a dominant tenement, but rather for its 
illustration of the old rules of restraint of trade 
74
. 
And as to the resurgence of judicial statements echoing 
the words of Lord Cottenham in Tulk v. Moxhay, for example 
North P. in Robi~son v. Golden Chip2 : 
75 
I think it would be wrong for this 
court to give voice to an opinion 
that in these days persons who freely 
and voluntarily purchase another's land 
and ~usine~2 and subject themselves to 
a tie can repudiate the tie while 
retaining the benefit. 
and Lord Pearce in Esso Petroleum v. Harpers Garage: 
76 
It would be intolerable if, when a man 
chooses of his own free will to buy, or 
take a tenacy of land which is made subject 
to a tie (doins so on terms more favourable 
to hirrself owing to the existance 
of the tie) he can then repudiate the 
tie while retaining the benefit. 
such statements are as equally applicable to the policy consider-
ations involved in restraint of trade as they are to the desirability 
of enforcing a covenant agai st an assignee of the covenanter. 
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But such statements as those quoted, being made in relation 
to business covenants, may provide policy considerations 
reinforcing the forthcoming suggestion that a business may 
and should, be seen as a legitimate and sufficient dominant 
tenement. 
A Widening of the Conception of 'Dominant Tenement'? 
It is submitted that although the proposition that 
77 
in the context of solus agreement [sic], 
the Courts of England, Australia and 
New Zealand have ignored L.C.C. v. 
Allen and restored Catt v. Tourle 
to hold that the burden of such an 
agreement will bind purchasers from 
the covenanter who come to land 
already burdened, and with notice of 
the burden even though there be no 
domi nani:__ tene~en~el d by the 
coven an tee 
cannot be supported as such nevertheless it still serves to point, 
for what this writer believes to be the first time, to the 
observation that something is happening, as evidenced by the 
solus agreement cases, in relation to conceptiors as to 
do minant tenenents held by the covenartee. 
It is submitted tha t rather than saying such covenants will 
be enforced against third parties despite the lack of a dominant 
tenement the solus agreement cases are really showing the changing 
nature of the necessary dominant terement. A do~inant tenement 
must still be retained by the covenantee in order to enforc e 
the obligat ion against an assignee of the covenanter, but the 
n~cc ssary characteristics of that dominant tenewent wust be seen 
to have changed. 
Salus agreewents are collateral agreements - they affect, 
at most, the use to which the land is put and what is done upon 
~r e land rather than affecting the land itself. Such collateral 
co e nants were regarded as personal and as not 'touching and 
concerning' the land and would therefore not be capable of 
running with the land under the doctrineof Tul~ v. ~oxhay. 
Ye t in the solus agri:ewent cases and in a nuwber of other 
•E~:, ictive covenant cases, particularly the Ne~ton tbbott Coop 
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ca se a nd the de cision of the High Court of Australia in 
Quadra main v. Sevastapol 78 , these collateral cov e nants have 
been accorded full restrictive covenant status and in a number 
of instances have attracted the use of L.C.C. v. Allen in order 
t o deal with them, rather than being labelled mere collateral 
co vena nts a nd be ing de ni e d the ability to r un with the land on 
t hat basis. 
The one co mm on factor coming through in these cases is that 
t he covenantee is seeking to protect via the covenant not land 
its elf nor, antith e tically, som e pr iv at e pers on al wh i msy 
but r ather so me a ctual and valu a ble busine s s interest. 
It is sub mit t ed that the possibility must be recognised 
tha t a bus ine ss i ts elf, as di s ti nct f rom any land it is 
situated upon , i s now con s idered more than somet hi ng me rely 
person al t o t he cov e nan t ee and is be i ng se en as sufficie nt t o be 
an int er est ca pable of constituting a 'do minant t enement', the 
benef it f o r whi ch a restr ictive covenant of the solus agree ment 
type can be enforced aga i nst an as si gnee of the cov en an t or. 
This proposition is a necess a ry im pli cati on from t he Newton 
Abbott Coo~ case wher ein i t wa s he ld a covenan t was enforceabl e 
despite clearly being taken for the prevention of competition . 
The inference to be taken from this is that the land in these 
cases is incidental and th e actua l interest which is being 
allowed to be protecte d i s the business itself . If then the 
land is incidental there should be no valid reason for not 
allowing enforce me nt of a coverant protecting a business 
interes t independant of any proximate land. 
By going back to the fun~a~ental princi ples underlying the 
restrictive cove~ant doctr ine and considering them in light of 
present day values and realities there e me rges a strong 
conceptual reationa li sati on for se eing a business interest as 
sufficient to constitut e a new class of 'dominant tenement~ 
We must begin by asking what it is ~hich render s the 
doctr i ne o f Tulk v. Moxhay so special and so r ule -bou nd and 
rigi dly controlle d and regulated. The answer is surely that 
the doct r i ne is an exce tion to the indomitable doctrine of 
Privit y of Contract and as such woul d ha ve been generally 
abhorred, and con seque ntly s t ric tly cir cumscribed, by the 
Ce:r.rron Law . Therefore to warrant such an exception to Privity 
of Contract what is needed is sorre very special , • erest tc be 
- 24-
protected, with attributes such as per manence and value 
justifying protection beyond the strict rule of Privity of Contract. 
Surely it is this interest, warranting such protection, which is 
what is meant by the term-of-art 'dominant tenement' - a dominant 
t e ne ment is the interest or class of interests which justify 
depar ture f r om the doctrine of Privity of Cont r act in o r der to 
protect them by providing the power to bind a non-party. 
Land is only an example of an inter est amounting to a 'dominant 
te nement' - albeit until recently the only e xample. 
In t he l at e nin etee nth centu ry whe n t he req uisite el eme nts 
f or t he running of a restrictive cov enan t wer e be ing considered 
t he only sufficiently valuable, per man e nt, and i mpor t ant inte r est 
warran ting such s pe cial treatment was land - a man's l a nd was his 
all . As land was f or s o lon g the only such i nteres t suf fi cient 
t o con stitu t e a ' dom i na nt teneme nt' th e courts began to see 
l a nd as the rule for a domi na nt tenement not merely as an example 
of a dominan t tenemen t, th us we get t he do gma tic sta tem ents by 
judge s , most i nfluent ially those of Buc kl ey L. J. i n L.C . C. v. 
Allen th at l an d an d on l y lan d could su ffice as a dom i nant 
tenemen t for the purpos es o f t his doctrine . 
So we have the situation where land is seen univers al l y a s 
a domina nt tenement for the protection of which an exceptio n 
to Pr ivity of Con trac t can be invoked. 
What th en i s the li mitation on the effective protect i on 
of a piece of land? Land is all the sere in terws of being 
spatially fixed, essentially two-dimensional, and having a 
limited sphere of influence . So the appropriate regime for 
protecting a land-type dominant tenement need only extend to 
other pieces of land in the i111r::diate vicinity as~piece of 
land can on ly directl y affect another when the two are physically 
clos e t oge ther. Thus the old rule necessitating some proximate 
land for the benefit of which the covenant was created makes 
good sense as there is no justification for allowing the 7 Uli v. 
Moxhay exception to Privity of Contract t o be used when the two 
pie ces are separated to the exte nt th at th ey co ul d not affect, 
or be a ffected by, each othe r. And in keeping with the very 
restr i cte d s phere of influence which land itself possesses 
the law declared t he a cceptable level of such separation to be 
mini1ral . 
Eut jn today's ~ore sophisticated and commercially 
orientated world there is an interest which has come to possess 
the same attributes necessary to r1erit the title 'do1rir,ant 
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tenement' and to deserve the invocation of the Ju~~ v. Moxh~ 
exception to Privity of Contract that land has enjoyed exclusively 
for the past one hundred and thirty years. The incorporated 
business interest, the spectacular growth of which has been an 
economic and legal feature of the last fifty years, is in many 
relevant respects analogous to land for the purposes of this 
doctrine - it is valuable and through incorporation acquires 
an existance which is both independant of any individual and 
is potentially perpetual. It is land's equivalent in all 
relevant respects in warranting such protection. 
Business interests must be seen to have joined land 
as being sufficient to warrant the application of the Tulk v. 
~~.20_ay principle and thereby earning the title 'dominant tenement'. 
In the business covenant cases it is for the value of the 
business that the covenant has been taken, and it is important 
not to confuse the business with its mere physical location on 
some land. Here the land is incidental to the business interest 
so questions must be asked as to the validity of subjecting the 
business interest to rules applicable only to land. The 
business interest is a different creature and deserves and 
requires rules of i~s own. 
If, then, a business inte rest can be seen as a dominant 
tenement forthe purposesof the modern Tulk v. Moxhay doctrine the 
next stage is to consider how this business interest is suitably 
protecte d. It has been seen that the law has rightly considered 
that to protect land-type dowinant tenements the restriction 
must relate to some other im me diately proximate land, or to land~ 
equivalent such as the inter e sts of a mortgagee and lessor, 
as the sphere of influence o• land is relatively limited. But in 
contrast the sphere of influ ence of a business is potentially much 
great er. The business exists 'up above' any land upon which it 
is situated and its protective umbrella can justifiably extend 
much further afield than can that of t~o-diwensional, spatially 
fixed, immutable land. 
Business interest dominant tenements, not being as 
intrinsically similar as land interests, can not have one fixed 
~tandard delimiting their zones of effect, as the blanket 
proxi~ate-e state necessity does for land -type dominant tenewents. 
Busi~e ss interests are rranifested in a myriad of variations and 
tne acce,,tabl e limits of the zone of influence for each must 
Le dete,nined on policy and practical considerati on s. 
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to which a businessman can create a competition-free zone 
within which he can validly encumber land by a restriction as 
to business activities detrimental to his existing business 
must ultimately depend on the type of business being protected 
and, relatedly, its ascertainable zone of useful influence. 
Again, in this respect, the law of restrictive covenants 
and the doctrine of restraint of trade can be seen to be coming 
together as the geographical limits within which a business 
may be protected via the mechanism of a restrictive covenant 
are set by the same types of considerations of situation, 
character, ard policy as are the limits within which a business 
may be protected without falling foul of the doctrine of 
restraint of trade in relation to restraints imposed upon 
employees . 
Returning to the question of scope of protection and the 
geographical area over which a businessman can see his business 
as providing a dominant tenement for the protection of which can 
enforce covenants he has created, or come to, as against a 
third party, we may consider antithetic examples of the range of 
geographic al protection that businesses may attract. If it could 
be established that the effective and acceptable market range of 
a horse-whip manufactur ing business was in the order of fifty miles 
then why should not such a horse-whip manufacturer be able to 
restrict any property in which he has an interest, and which 
comes to be sold, within so relatively large a radius as fifty 
miles of the site of his business so as to prevent competitive 
production on the demised site. Due to its nature his business 
e~anates an ethereal cloud of influence constantly hovering 
over the appropriate area and providing sufficient an interest o,er 
that area to enforce any such business-protective covenant 
against third parties with notice . Conversely, it may well be 
that a chemist business situated on Lambton Quay could only 
expect to acceptably so restrict a site within a radius of 
perhap s fifty yar ds - its effective zone of influence, as 
determined largely by its nature and situation, being quite 
limited. 
Conclusion 
The Tul~ v. Mox~}l doctrine allowing the burden of a 
restrictive covenant to run in Equity to bind third parties with 
notice is notable in that it exists as an exception to the for~-
idable doctrine of Privity of Contract. Such exception must 
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itself exist to protect something - there can be no validity 
in the suggestion that a dominant tenement should not be needed 
in order to allow a restrictive covenant to run with the land as 
there must always by some interest retained by the covenantee for 
the significant benefit of which the covenant can be enforced. 
It would indeed be "an indefensible extension of a contractual 
liability to a non-contracting party" 79 to allow a covenantee 
to enforce a covenant against a non-party unless the covenantee 
had a valuable and acceptable interest to protect by doing so. 
It is submitted not that the need for such an interest, that 
is, a dominant tenement, is being questioned or eroded but rather 
that the question as to what constitutes such an interest must 
be reconsidered. 
For an interest to warrant the Ju_l_!_ v. Moxha_t. exception to 
be invoked for its protection it must have special attributes 
of value, permanence, and . be more than a merely personal interest. 
This interest, deserving of such protection, is surely what is 
mean t by the stylistic term I dominant teneme nt', so that the 
categoric al statements by earlier courts that some land was 
necessary as a dominant tenement are overstating the situation. 
Land is an ~xampl~ of a 'dominant tenewe nt', that is, it 
possesse s the attributes warranting application of the Tulk v. 
Mox~at doctrine, but to define 'dominant tenement' as being land 
and no other type of interest is both myopic and wanting for a 
conceptua l justification. 
It has been contended, at some length, that a business is 
now able to be seen as amounting to a dominant tenement for the 
purposes of the doctrine; it has the necessary attributes making 
it worth y of such protection, and in reality it is usually for 
a business interest that restrictive covenants of the type 
discussed are created - any land is merely incidental. 
There can be no objection to a business being seen as a 
do IT i ri ant t er, e ,rent on the grounds of i t s e s sent i al l y i n tang i b l e 
ratur e as it has long been settled law that abstract manifestatiors 
of the land-type dominant tenement, namely landlords' reversions 
r.nd mort~agee s' interests. are acceptable dominant tenement 
intere sts. 
The accepted proximate-estate rule for a land-type dominant 
tenerrent is perfectly in keeping with the protection that land 
itself needed, but such a li rriled zone of protection cannot 
v a l i d l y b e i rr r., o s e d u p o n a b u s i r e s s - t :1 p e d o rr i r, a n t t e r e ~ e n t w h i c h r c. s 
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a potentially much wider sphere of interest than land. An1 
neither is one fixed standard applicable to busin~ss-type 
dominant tenements which,in contrast to land's inherent 
homogeneity, are of multitudinous variety. 
It is submitted in conclusion that the solus agreement cases, 
covenant 
in conjunction with other recent restrictiveAcases dealing with 
co ven ants for the protection of business, require a reappraisal 
of the purportedly accepted view of the nature and meaning of a 
'dominant tenement' for the purposes of the doctrine of 
Tulk v. Moxhay. 
By seeing a business interest as the second acceptable 
example of a dominant tenement we can not only begin to 
ration alise some of the doubts expressed from time to time as to 
the strict traditional view taken of the dominant tenement 
requireme nt, but also legitimise some of the inconsistancies 
which have arisen from persistant adherence to an anachronistic 
conception of the nature of a dominant tenement. 
Also by seeing a business interest in this light we can 
provide a firm foundation for the de velopment of a more realist ic 
and commercially expedient body o f doctrine relating to the 
running of the burden of restrictive covenants. 
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